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Abstract: 
 
In the wake of the debt ceiling crisis in the summer of 2011, the effect of the 
United States’ massive and growing national debt on asset markets has become a greater 
concern. With the banking and finance industry now taking up an increasing share of the 
United States economy, it is important to understand how ongoing increases in the 
national debt affect the value of firms in this industry. In particular, negative market 
reactions to increases in the allowable debt (the debt ceiling) may reduce investor wealth 
and perhaps also the willingness of banks to facilitate flows of capital and investment. In 
this thesis, an event study methodology is used to examine how announcements of 
increases in the debt ceiling affect the stock returns of firms in the banking industry and 
whether these potential effects have changed over time from year 1984 to 2006. 
However, this study finds that, overall, debt ceiling announcements have had statistically 
insignificant effects on the stock returns of commercial banks and created minimal 
abnormal return in the firms’ stocks. Thus, these findings support the idea that from 1984 
to 2006 the rising debt, as illustrated by the debt ceiling, insignificantly impacted the 
stock returns of the banking industry. 
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 4 
I. Introduction 
  
 In the United States, the growth of the nation’s sovereign debt has become 
increasingly more of a hot button issue in both economic and political debate. Over the 
past several decades, the national debt level has grown significantly. Currently, the 
national debt totals over 15 trillion dollars, over 48 thousand dollars per United States 
citizen1. As the debt obligations continue to rise, there has been growing concern over the 
liquidity of the government as well as other potential repercussions from its size.  
 The United States debt ceiling is a threshold set by Congress that limits the level 
of debt issued by the government. The debt ceiling was instilled in 1917, so that Congress 
did not need to acquiesce to every spending request by the Treasury2. However, 
historically as the debt level has approached this ceiling, Congress increases the ceiling to 
allow the government further spending leeway. Recently, as the debt has become 
exponentially larger, the issue of raising the debt ceiling has created severe political and 
economic controversy.   
In the summer of 2011, the United States suffered a debt-ceiling crisis that 
eventually led to Standard and Poor’s downgrading the US Treasury rating. As the debt 
approached the limit, constant political debate ensued over the best procedure to reduce 
the US debt while also preventing a default. This uncertainty caused the markets to 
fluctuate drastically as each news event reached the public. The issue of raising the debt 
ceiling undoubtedly contributed to constant volatility in the markets. As a result, this 
raises the question of whether raising the debt ceiling has historically impacted stock 
market returns, specifically in the banking industry. 
                                                        
1 National Public Debt Outstanding. United States Treasury. Retrieved December, 2011.  
2 "A Brief History of the U.S. Federal Debt Limit". Freegovreports.com. 2010-01-28. Retrieved 2011-
08-07 
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The financial services and banking industry is not only a crucial aspect of the 
United States and global economies, but it has also been taking up an increasingly larger 
share of employment in the US. From 1980 to 2008, the amount of workers employed in 
the “financial activities” sector rose from around 2.5 million to approximately 8.3 
million3. During this same period, total employment in the United States increased from 
99 million to approximately 140 million, a 41% increase compared to the 232% increase 
in the financial sector. In addition, the financial sector currently holds the third largest 
share of market capitalization in the New York Stock Exchange behind the Consumer 
Goods and Basic Material sectors4. With continued growth in the financial sector, the 
United States’ reliance on a strong banking industry has followed. As Fisher explains in 
his speech in Brazil in 2003, strong financial markets make a country less susceptible to 
recession and promote greater growth through the ease of investment funding5.   
This study is specifically interested in examining the effects of raising the debt 
limit on the banking industry because the banking industry is expected to be most 
exposed and susceptible to the rising sovereign risk of the United States. With more debt 
on their balance sheets while also mediating the flow of the US treasuries in secondary 
markets, the Banking Industry is undoubtedly exposed to the potential mal-effects of a 
rise in the debt ceiling (and debt level) than any other industry. Banks, more than any 
other industry, hold and are exposed to the United States debt. One of the main holders of 
the US debt is money market mutual funds managed by banks as well as similarly 
                                                        
3 Federal Census Bureau Reports. “Employment” and “Industry Specification.” 2008. United States 
Census Bureau. Retrieved December 28th, 2011.  
4 Historical Industry Market Capitalization. 2008. Yahoo.finance.com. Retrieved December 28th, 2011. 
5 Fisher, Stanley. 2003. “The Importance of Financial Markets in Economic Growth.” Citigroup.  
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managed financial funds6. The increasing risk and potential losses on banks’ holdings 
weaken their balance sheets, increase funding costs, and could possibly reduce their 
access to secondary markets7. Assuming that investors are aware of a banks exposure and 
react rationally to all available information, it is expected that the banking sector might 
be affected negatively by growing sovereign debt.   
As a country begins to accumulate debt, at some point the leverage of the 
government’s balance sheet becomes risky. If any shock occurs to the economy that 
requires excess fiscal expenditures while also decreasing revenue, for example a 
recession, the nations debt could pose a serious problem. With less income and increases 
spending, it could become difficult for a country to fund their debt8. Therefore, this study 
aims to not only investigate the effect of debt ceiling announcements on banks’ stock 
returns but also how these affects have changed over time. It is expected that investors 
react accordingly because that growing sovereign debt increases each note’s liquidity 
risk. However, if they deem that the level and budget of the United States government is 
not yet a concern, then the debt ceiling announcements should hypothetically have zero 
impact on the banking industry’s stock returns. As the US debt has grown consistently 
over the past several decades, it follows that if the debt has impacted stock returns at 
some point, then the size of this impact will increase as the size of the debt has expanded. 
Nevertheless, the United States debt obligations are almost unanimously considered risk-
free investments. As a result, it is possible that raising the debt ceiling (and debt) will 
have little effect on investors and stock prices.  
                                                        
6 Anand, Hitesh. July, 2011. “Who Are the Largest Holders of US Debt?” Wealthson. 
http://www.wealthson.com/1549/who-are-the-largest-holders-of-us-debt 
7 Panetta, Fabio et al.. July, 2011. “The Impact of Sovereign Credit Risk on Bank Funding Conditions.” 
Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS). Bank for International Settlements.  
8 Panetta et al, 2011. 
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 Another possible reason that the accumulating United States debt could have an 
impact on the stock returns for the banking industry is the potential effect that issuing 
more treasury notes could have on the bond markets and interest rates. In a simplistic 
supply and demand model of the market for US Treasuries, the increase in supply in the 
market due to the new issuance of treasuries will increase equilibrium interest rates. The 
increasing yield on a treasury note will undoubtedly affect the funding for banks. 
Historically, the rates on banks’ notes, depending on the company’s credit rating, are 
issued and trade a certain amount of basis points above the treasury yield. Therefore, if 
the yield on a treasury increases as a result of increased supply in the market, this will 
cause the rates on banks’ notes to increase as well. The increased rates on the notes banks 
issue will thus increase the funding costs of the firm. As a result, the increased costs to 
the bank should decrease their value, which is expected to be reflected in their stock 
price. However, this is based on the assumption that the bank issues new debt. If they 
only have debt outstanding, simply trading on the secondary markets, the potential 
increase in the yield of a treasury will only affect the prices at which the outstanding 
notes trade. This will result in no cost incurred to the bank.  
 Therefore, as the growing United States debt has progressively become more of 
an issue coupled with its relationship with and the importance of the banking industry, 
the purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect that the growing debt has had on the 
stock returns of the banking industry. In doing so, this study will use an event study 
methodology and with the event of raising the debt ceiling serving as a proxy for the 
growing debt will measure and test the significance of the impact these events have on 
banks’ stock returns.  
 8 
The balance of this paper is ordering in the following manner. Section II 
summarizes relevant literature on the effects of sovereign debt growth, actions of 
investors in the equity markets, and other relevant research. Section III presents the data 
and the empirical model that will be applied in this study. Lastly, Section IV summarizes 
and analyzes the results, and Section V offers concluding interpretations. 
II. Related Literature: 
 The issue of gross national debt has been analyzed and written about for years. 
Most of this literature recognizes the mal-effects of being over leveraged, written from a 
broad range of perspectives and with a variety of foci. However, none of which directly 
touch on the issue of raising the debt ceiling to accommodate the United States immense 
overspending and its subsequent effects on the banking industry’s stock returns.  
 When looking into relevant literature, two aspects are important to this paper: the 
effects of growing national debt and the rationality of investors in equity markets. Early 
studies tend to use empirical evidence to examine the main economic advantages to 
lowering a national debt level. Using theoretical analysis, Meade (1958) showed that 
reducing a nation’s debt level will encourage workers to work more, save more and 
increase private investment9. As a result, the increased investment demand should put 
upward pressure on asset prices. Thus, it can be deduced that stock prices (and returns) 
will rise as a result of reducing the federal debt.  
 An evident problem that exists between the dynamic of a macroeconomic variable 
such as a Nation’s sovereign debt and the stock market is the question of whether 
investors react rationally to economic conditions and if they act rationally. Chen, Roll 
                                                        
9 Meade, J.E. 1958. “Is the National Debt a Burden?” Oxford Economic Papers. Vol. 10, No. 2. Pp. 163-
183.  
 9 
and Ross (1986) performed a study to analyze what economic forces drive stock prices. 
Using time series analysis with derived economic variables, they were able to show that 
certain economic conditions such as industrial production, unexpected and expected 
inflation, and risk premiums are significant in the predicting stock market returns10. They 
conclude that stock prices do depend on macroeconomic conditions and they 
consequently react depending on their exposure. This is relevant in this study because, 
assuming that the banking industry is adequately exposed to US debt, the abnormality of 
stock market returns after a rise in the debt ceiling should be visible if an impact exists.  
Contrarily, Summers (1985) attempts to show that stock market values do not 
accurately show a company’s value and that investors do not rationally price in economic 
conditions which would not only run counter to Chen, Roll, and Ross’s findings but 
would undermine the results of this study. By using test of market efficiency over a 
period of 50 years prior to his research, he sets out to show that stock values do not 
accurately portray sensible valuations11. He elaborates on Brainard, Shoven, and Weiss’ 
(1986) finding that the low stock values could not have been correlated with economic 
conditions of the time12. In his analysis, Summers recognizes that investors react to only 
the news that they are exposed to and he understands that stock prices almost 
instantaneously react to news. In doing so, he is speculative of the valuation errors that 
may result. Therefore, in his research he fails to show that the stock market is an 
                                                        
10 Chen, Nai- Fu, Roll, Richard, and Ross, Stephen A. 1986. “Economic Forces and the Stock Market.” 
The Journal of Business. Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 383-403.   
11 Summers, Lawrence H. 1986. “Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values.” The 
Journal of Finance. Vol. 41. No. 3. New York, New York, pp. 591-601.  
12 Brainard, William C. Shoven, John B. and Weiss, Laurence. "The Financial Valuation of the Return of 
Capital." Brookings Paperson Economic Activity (1980), pp. 453-502. 
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inefficient market and simply cautions treating stock prices as an accurate and rational 
correlation to firm values.  
While research on the relationship between macro variables and the volatility of 
stock market returns is relevant in this study, another relevant and important research 
topic is the implications of accumulating sovereign debt. Afonso and Sousa (2008) 
investigated the effects of fiscal policy including looking at debt and government 
spending and their effects on macroeconomic conditions that furthermore affect stock 
prices. They show that government spending shocks result in a statistically significant 
“crowding out” effect, which increases interest rates13. Subsequently, private investment 
falls and real asset prices decline. Therefore, their study shows that government spending 
and especially growing government debt can have a significant effect on private 
investment which can filter to the equity markets.  
 More specifically, in July of 2011, a study group established by the Committee on 
the Global Financial System submitted a paper analyzing the effect that sovereign credit 
risk can have on banking funding conditions. With rapid increases in budget deficits 
globally, they recognize that many countries are no longer viewed as a “risk free” 
investments, and many more in the future will share this same fate. In their paper, they 
note main impacts on a bank that can result from a sovereign crisis, a downgrade, or 
increasing risk due to growing sovereign debt. First, losses on government holdings by 
banks will result in weaker balance sheets. Furthermore, the increased sovereign risk will 
reduce the banks access to funding due to decreased collateral and liquidity. In addition, 
                                                        
13 António Afonso and Ricardo M. Sousa, 2008. "The Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal 
Policy," Working Papers 2008/56, Department of Economics at the School of Economics and 
Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon. 
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the paper finds that a downgrade of government securities can often reduce the ratings on 
the bank depending on the banks exposure. Citing the European debt crisis, they note that 
sovereign debt often times is not as risk-averse and liquid as expected14. Therefore, in 
times of distress and to reduce risk, they explain that the banks need to take certain 
strides to protect against increased sovereign risk and increase funding and liquidity. 
However, these risk aversion efforts incur costs to the bank. Therefore, the paper shows 
that growing sovereign debt and a decrease in “creditworthiness” have significant ill 
effects on the value and operations of the banking industry.  
 In 1982, Mexico experienced a severe debt crisis, during which the country was 
forced to default on their foreign and domestic obligations. Their defaulting on loans 
resulted in a rapid decline in the Mexican banks’ stock values. In Smirlock and Kaufold’s 
(1987) paper, they investigate whether the reactions of stock prices were proportionate to 
each bank’s exposure to the risky debt. Using a time series regression, they analyze the 
debt default on the changes in stock returns. They conclude that investors were able to 
accurately distinguish between banks with low or high exposure to the debt. This is 
relevant in this paper because it shows that investors rationally react and price in events, 
specifically the nations’ debt levels. Furthermore, they are aware of the exposures of the 
banking industry15. Therefore, if the debt ceiling is raised by congress because of upward 
pressure from the United States debt level, it is expected that the stock returns of a bank 
with a gross amount of US treasuries on its balance sheet should experience a decline 
following such an announcement.  
                                                        
14 Panetta et al, 2011. 
15 Smirlock, Michael and Kaufold, Howard.1987. “Bank Foreign Lending, Mandatory Disclosure Rules, 
and the Reaction of Bank Stock Prices to the Mexican Debt Crisis. "The Journal of Business , Vol. 60, 
No. 3 (Jul., 1987), pp. 347-364. 
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 Because this study employs an event study methodology, it is important to note in 
what ways this methodology has been used. The purpose of the event study methodology 
is to enable economists to measure and analyze the effect that an economic event has on 
the value of a firm. Assuming the rationality of investors and the market, the 
methodology has enabled economists to study the effects of mergers and acquisitions, 
earnings announcements, new capital issuances, as well as macroeconomic events such as 
in this paper. There have in fact been several economists who have analyzed the effect of 
various macroeconomic events and variables on daily stock returns, none of which 
explore the issue of a growing national debt directly.  
Schwert (1981) investigated the reaction of daily stock returns to news concerning 
inflation during the period 1953 to 1978. Because of nominal contracts between two 
parties, Schwert writes that “unexpected inflation increases the wealth of the debtor and 
decreases the wealth of the creditor.16” Therefore, unexpected inflation would decrease 
the wealth of the firm, in most cases the debtors, decreasing their value and potentially 
stock prices. In an event study, however, Schwert found a weak relationship between 
unexpected inflation shocks and stock prices, with the events’ impacts insignificant.  
Pearce and Roley (1985) additionally examined the effects of several 
macroeconomic conditions on stock returns. In their study, they controlled for 
expectations by using survey data, which allowed them to more accurate gauge the effect 
of each event on the market. In their results, they found that prices did respond to 
monetary information for a period from September, 1977 to October, 1982. They 
investigated the effect of changes in money supply, money demand, and discount rate on 
                                                        
16 Schwert, G.W. 1981. “The Adjustment of Stock Prices to Information about Inflation.” Journal of 
Finance, 36, 15-29.  
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the returns of stocks across industries as well as over time17. They note that building on 
previous studies, they covered a wider time period.  However, they also showed in their 
analysis that news concerning the unemployment, output, as well as the consumer price 
index produced insignificant effects on stock prices.  
In addition, Hardouvelis (1987) used a broader approach considering a larger set 
of 15 macroeconomic variables throughout August 1984. The focus of this paper was to 
distinguish, using a large set of variables, the effects of monetary versus nonmonetary 
news and their respective effects on stock returns. Furthermore, a main interest was to 
investigate the role of the Federal Reserve and its actions on stock market prices. Similar 
to Pearce and Roley (1985), Hardouvelis showed that monetary news predominantly had 
an impact on stock prices while the other variables showed a weak and insignificant 
relationship18.  
McQueen and Roley (1993) used an event study methodology to investigate the 
relationship between various macroeconomic news events and the daily stock returns of 
firms. In doing so, they built on previous event studies, involving similar relationships 
between macroeconomic variables and daily stock returns, which showed varied results.  
Furthermore, before McQueen and Roley’s study, little had been shown to support a 
significant response of stock prices to macroeconomics news. One main flaw, they posit, 
is the fact that previous studies assume that the response to news concerning 
macroeconomic events is constant across all business cycles19. They note that in Cutler, 
                                                        
17 Pearce, D.K. and Roley, V.V. 1985. “Stock Prices and Economic News.” Journal of Business, 58, pp. 
49-67.  
18 Hardouvelis, G.A.. 1987. “Macroeconomic Information and Stock Prices.” Journal of Economics and 
Business, 39. pp. 131-140.  
19 McQueen, G. and Roley, V.V. 1993. “Stock Prices, News, and Business Conditions.” Oxford University 
Press.  
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Poterba, and Summers (1989) study using vector autoregressions to measure the effect of 
news of macroeconomic events, they assume that an increase in industrial output at the 
end of the Great Depression should induce a result similar to an increase in output after a 
decade of growth20. Therefore, in their paper, McQueen and Roley investigate the effects 
of macroeconomic news across different business cycles. They considered 
unemployment, the trade deficit, inflation, as well as other macro indices. Their results 
helped to explain why previously there was little evidence to show macroeconomic 
variables have little impact on stock market prices.  
 
III. Data and Empirical Model 
3.1 Data 
 The data range for this study spans from 1984 until 2006. Using the debt ceiling 
announcements during this period, this study will test the significance of the abnormal 
return on the banking industry’s stock returns resulting from these announcements. The 
ending year 2006 is used as a result of the rapid evolution of the banking industry as well 
as to avoid potential interference from the recent financial crises. The beginning date of 
year 1984 has been determined by the amount of data available. Prior to 1984, there is not 
enough data from the list of commercial banks to be consistent with the other results.  
The announcement dates have been taken from the historical debt ceiling timeline21. 
However, it is understood that the effect of these announcements may not be priced in on 
                                                        
20 Cutler, D.M, Poterba, J.M., and Summers, L.H. 1989. “What Moves Stock Prices?” Journal of Portfolio 
Management, 15. pp. 4-12.  
21 "Table 7.1—Federal Debt at the End of Year: 1940–2016". Historical Tables. Office of Management 
and Budget. Retrieved November 18, 2011. 
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the exact day and could vary. As a result, sensitivity and precaution will be employed in 
order to correctly assign the “event.” 
 When accumulating data for the banking industry, this study will use the 
historical daily closing prices for the United States’ largest publically traded commercial 
banks, according to the 2006 Fortune 500 ranking, as well as their daily trading 
volumes22. The list of commercial banks comes from the 2006 Fortune 500 rankings; 
their historical prices are then tracked back all the way to their inception as a publically 
traded bank (i.e. Initial Public Offering). However, due to the complex nature and 
evolution of the financial services industry, mergers and acquisitions have absorbed or 
eliminated many of the banks that used to be prevalent. Due to this factor, additional 
prices and volumes are recorded for many banks that no longer exist or are currently part 
of another firm, which will supplement the initial data pool. The supplemental data or 
additional banks added to augment the existing data is determined using subjective 
liberties. If deemed to add consistency and significance to the analysis, these banks will 
be included. Using the daily closing prices for the collected list of banks, daily percent 
stock returns are calculated. These daily percent returns are then multiplied by the 
corresponding daily trading volume and then divided by the total volume for the entire 
list of data on that particular day. The sum of all these values will result in a total daily 
stock return across the whole banking portfolio, weighted by the trading volume. Using a 
weighted average of the daily stock returns will put greater importance and significance 
on the largest banks, which are more likely to have a larger exposure to the effects of the 
debt ceiling announcements. 
                                                        
22 Annual Ranking of America’s Largest Corporations. 2006. Fortune Magazine.  
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 In addition, the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index will be used as the market return 
in this study. Historically, it consistently has been a good indicator of overall market 
performance. For every instance that the debt ceiling was raised during our study range, 
we will test the impact of the announcement on the stock performance of the banks 
publically traded at that time.  
  
3.2 Event Study Methodology 
 To study the effect of debt ceiling announcements on the stock market returns of 
the banking industry, I will employ an event study methodology, specifically the Market 
Model. The purpose of this methodology is to test the significance of the effect of an 
event, in this case the announcement of raising the debt ceiling, on the return on a 
particular asset. In this study, aggregated stock returns of the “banking industry” have 
been accumulated in a portfolio, which will then be treated as a single asset. The model 
consists of several main parts: Event Definition, Selection Criteria, Normal Return, 
Abnormal Return, Estimation Procedure, and Testing Procedure. 
3.2.1 Event Definition 
 In order to assemble the Event Study model for this study, the first step is to 
determine the event in which we are measuring. As previously identified, the events of 
interest are the debt ceiling announcements between 1984 and 2006. However, as noted 
above, the actual event date is sensitive to investor knowledge. If investors anticipate the 
announcement, then the potential impact of the event could be priced into the stock 
returns prior to the announcement. As a result, when running regressions, investigative 
procedures will be used to best estimate the actual event date.  
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3.2.2 Selection Criteria 
 The selection criteria for this study is outlined in section 3.1 Data. A portfolio for 
the a list of commercial banks, weighted by trading volume, will be used in a market 
model approach where their returns are regressed against a market return, here the S&P 
500. 
3.2.3 Normal Return: Market Model 
 The normal return is a measure of the return on the asset if the event had not taken 
place. In order to calculate the normal return over the event window—as defined as the 
period of time during which the abnormal return from the event will be measured—the 
actual return on the asset must be regressed against the market return for a period of time 
leading up to the event, called the estimation window. Once acquiring the estimators for 
the normal return, the normal return can then be projected over the event window, which 
we will use to calculate the abnormal return. The normal return of the weighted average 
stock returns can be expressed as follows: 
Rt = βtRmt + εt 
Where Rt  is the return on the asset during period t, Rmt is the market return during that 
same period t, and εt is a zero mean error term. During the estimation window, it is 
assumed that there is zero abnormal return. After acquiring the estimators from the 
regression over the estimation period, the results are used in calculating the abnormal 
returns by projecting the “normal return” if the event had not occurred. This is explained 
further below.  
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3.2.4 Abnormal Return: Market Model 
 The abnormal return is essentially the difference between the actual measured 
return on the stock and the normal return over the event window. The abnormal return 
can be expressed in the following equation: 
ARl= Rl – E[Rl] 
where Rt is the actual observed return over the event window day “l” and where… 
E[Rl]= β*Rml + ε* 
β*
 
 in the above equation is the estimated coefficient on the market return acquired from 
the regression during the estimation window. Similarly, ε*
 
is the constant from the 
estimation window regressions for time period t. The difference in the observed market 
return and the estimated return produces the abnormal return for period “l.”  
For this study, we will aggregate the abnormal return over the entire event 
window. As a result, it is necessary to calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR): 
    

	

 
which is the sum of all of the abnormal returns for the event window days “l” to “L.” 
3.2.5 Estimation Procedure 
 For this model, the normal return will be measured during an estimation window 
of the 120 days leading up to the event. After this period will be the event window, a 3-
day period, during which the normal return will be projected and, using the expected 
value from the regression results, the abnormal return will be calculated. The abnormal 
returns will then be aggregated over the duration of the event window, resulting in the 
CAR. The 120-day estimation window is pending its availability. Several times since 
1984, the United States has raised the debt-ceiling consecutive times within 120 days of 
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each other. In such cases, the estimation window will begin after the conclusion of the 
event window for the previous announcement, at which point the idea that the abnormal 
return of the stocks is once again assumed to be zero.  
3.2.6 Testing Procedure 
 In testing the significance of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns measured during 
the event window over the 3-day period, in order for the tests to be run, certain main 
assumptions are required. First, we assume that the abnormal returns of the securities 
during the event window are normally distributed. Second, we assume cross-sectional 
independence, that the residuals of the regressions during the estimation window are 
independent across the different securities in our model. Furthermore, during the 
estimation window, we assume that this is a period of “normal return” and the residuals 
during this period (abnormal return) are assumed to be 0. A last assumption is needed in 
order to test the CAR, that was aggregated over a multi-day event window. Because the 
standard error used in this event study does not account for the potential correlation 
between error terms, we must assume that there is no autocorrelation between the 
abnormal returns over the event window. 
 In order to test the significance of the CAR against the null hypothesis that the 
CAR is equal to 0, or that there is no observed abnormal return from the debt ceiling 
announcements, a standard parametric t-test is employed.  As outlined above, the CAR is 
expressed by the equation below: 
    

	

 
Where AR is each daily abnormal return over the 3-day event window. The t-statistic for 
the CAR is shown below: 
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∑ 	
  
Where l denotes the days of the event window over which the abnormal returns are 
cumulated. However, since the CAR is equal to the summation of the AR over the event 
window: 
    
where: 
    

	

 
And where the S(AR) is expressed as follows: 
  ∑  
1 ∑ 	
  	
      
The standard deviations of the abnormal returns are estimated by a time series of the 
residuals of the abnormal returns during the estimation window where “t” to “T” with “T-
d” degrees of freedom. Because the standard deviations of the CARs are the sum of the 
standard deviations of the daily abnormal returns during the event window, it is necessary 
to first calculate the standard deviations of the abnormal returns. 
Therefore, the standard deviation of the CAR is the sum of the standard deviation 
of the abnormal returns for each of the days included in the CAR. However, since all of 
them are estimated using the same estimation window, the standard deviation remains 
constant for each day’s abnormal return. As a result, the standard deviation of the CAR is 
simply the S(AR) multiplied by the amount of days of the event window, in this case, 
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three. The t-statistic is distributed as Student-t with T-d degrees of freedom, where T is 
the amount of days in the estimation window and d, from the regression, is 2.  
3.3 Regressions Using Dummy Variables 
 Another more simplistic method to measure the effect of an event on stock market 
returns is to use event dummies that can distinguish between days before and after the 
event has occurred. In order to perform this method, the same regression will be used as 
used in the event study estimation window, regressing the banks’ stock returns against the 
market return. However, now a dummy variable will be added to differentiate between a 
day during the estimation before the event and a day during the event window, when we 
would see a potential impact on stock prices as a result of the event. The equation can be 
expressed as below: 
Rt = β1t Rmt + β2tD + εt 
Where Rt is the return on the asset during period t, Rmt is the market return during that 
same period t, D is the dummy for the and event window, and εt is a zero mean error 
term. Thus, D will be “0” for all days during the estimation window and will hold a value 
of “1” for the days in the estimation window. From these regressions we can test the 
significance on the coefficient of the dummy variable using a simple t-test where: 
    
Where t is distributed normally as a student-t distribution with T-d degrees of freedom. If 
the coefficient on the dummy variable proves to be significant then it shows the event 
causes a “break” in the relationship the banks’ stock returns and the market return. 
Assuming that raising the debt level would have a negative impact on the banking 
industry’s stock prices, then it is that expected the coefficient on the dummy variable 
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would be negative. This means that during the event window, the event would decrease 
the banks stock returns by the amount of the coefficient. Therefore, using these dummy 
variables is a simplistic approach to investigating the potential impact of debt ceiling 
announcements on bank stock returns.  
IV. Results 
 In the analysis of the effect that raising the debt ceiling has on the stock returns of 
the commercial banks, the event study methodology was unable to return strong evidence 
that over time that debt ceiling announcements have created abnormal stock returns for 
banks. In the following sections, the results are outlined and explained.  
4.1 Estimation Window Regressions 
 When the regressions for the estimation windows were run in order calculate the 
estimators of the normal return, I found a strong positive correlation between the return 
of the banks’ stock and the market return, the Standard and Poor’s 500 index. Assuming 
that the S&P 500 is a good indicator of market performance, which is a generally 
accepted assumption, this result suggests that during this period there was likely no 
visible return in the banks stocks abnormal from the market return. Moreover, significant 
coefficients for the S&P 500 are necessary in order for the abnormal returns to be more 
properly measured and tested. Because the standard deviations of the CARs are estimated 
based on the residuals of the regressions, the smaller the amount of variance during the 
estimation window will result in smaller standard deviations for the CARs. Therefore, it 
is more likely for the tests to produce a statistically significant result and reject the null 
that the CAR is equal to 0. If the coefficients on the market return during the estimation 
window had failed to be significant, this would result in far greater standard deviations 
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for the test statistics, resulting in insignificant CARs. Thus, I would fail to reject the null 
when potentially the abnormal return from the event window could in fact be 
significantly different from 0. Therefore, the significance of the coefficients suggests that 
the event study should produce accurate results based on the estimators acquired from the 
regressions shown in Table 1.   
TABLE 1: Estimation Window Regressions Results 
Event Date 
Coefficient on S&P 500 
(Market Return) 
1 25-May-84 1.2180*** 
2 6-Jun-84 2.4474** 
3 13-Oct-84 1.9119*** 
4 14-Nov-85 1.0499*** 
5 12-Dec-85 1.3095*** 
6 21-Aug-86 1.0619*** 
7 21-Oct-86 1.0595*** 
8 15-May-87 1.3186*** 
9 10-Aug-87 0.9731*** 
10 29-Sep-87 0.8783*** 
11 7-Aug-89 0.9936*** 
12 8-Nov-89 0.6678*** 
13 9-Aug-90 0.7148*** 
14 28-Oct-90 0.7794*** 
15 5-Nov-90 - 
16 6-Apr-93 0.6087*** 
17 10-Aug-93 1.1712*** 
18 29-Mar-96 0.7495*** 
19 5-Aug-97 1.0314*** 
20 11-Jun-02 0.9821*** 
21 27-May-03 1.0062*** 
22 16-Nov-04 1.0389*** 
23 20-Mar-06 0.7746*** 
***Statistically significant at the .01 level, **at the .05 level, and *at the .10 level 
 Another result that the regression coefficients in Table 1 show is the relationship 
between the performances of commercial banks in comparison with the market return.  
The coefficients on the market return mean that if the market stock return increases by 
the 1, or 100% daily return, then the percent stock return on the portfolio of banks would 
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increase by the amount of the coefficient, or coefficient times 100 percent. In the results 
displayed in Table 1, the majority of the coefficients range from approximately 0.6 to 1.3, 
disregarding several outliers. From these numbers, we can induce the performance of the 
banking industry’s stocks relative to the rest of the market. For the coefficients below 1, 
then over the estimation window, the market return was greater than the return of the 
banking industry. For example, for Event 16, for a 100% increase in the return of the 
S&P 500, the stock return of the banking industry, as represented by the portfolio used in 
this analysis, will only increase by 60.87%. Therefore, the percent increase in the return 
of the market is approximately 40% greater than that of the banking industry. The 
opposite holds true for the events whose coefficients are greater than 1. Nevertheless, 
excluding the Events 2 and 3 who are outliers and Event 15 for which there was not 
enough data to run a regression, the mean coefficient on the S&P 500 stock return was 
0.9694. The mean of the coefficients, being so close to 1, shows that overall the banking 
industry’s stock performance follows closely with the overall market performance. Their 
relationship is almost directly proportional, where a 100% increase in the market return 
would result in a 100% increase in the stock return of the commercial banks in the 
portfolio used in this study. In calculating the mean of the coefficients in Table 1, 
outliers, Events 2 and 3, were omitted because compared to the rest of the data, they are 
much higher. The estimation window for Event 2, on June 6th, 1984, was only a period of 
3 days because it occurred shortly after the previous announcement date on May 25, 
1984. As a result, although the coefficient is significant at the .05 level, with such few 
observations, the coefficient might be skewed due to the 3 day estimation window. 
However, Event 3 had a proper 120 day estimation window and is significant at the .01 
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level. Nevertheless, it was ignored in calculating the average coefficient because it is 
unlikely that the banking industry would experience twice as much return than the rest of 
the market. With a coefficient of 1.9119, if the market return increases by 100%, this 
suggests that the banking industry’s return would increase by 191.19%, almost 100 
percentage points greater than the market. It is unlikely that over time any industry would 
experience this amount of growth greater than the market, unless as an emerging industry 
or due to technology. Lastly, Event 15, like Event 2, occurred very shortly after another 
event, and as a result, the estimation window was not long enough to produce any results.  
 
4.2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 In Table 2, I present the results for the debt ceiling announcements occurring 
during the period from 1984 to 2006. The table shows the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CARs) aggregated over each of the 3-day event windows. From initially examining the 
data and returns surrounding the day on which raising the debt ceiling was actually 
announced, it was decided that often times the announcement was anticipated prior to the 
event. As a result, the event window set for the 23 events was from “l” to “l+2” where l 
was the day prior to which the announcement was made. Over these three days, the 
abnormal returns were accumulated and the CAR on day “l+2” (the sum of the abnormal 
returns over the three day period) was tested for its significance using a standard 
deviation as explained above. It is probable that the day on which the effects of these 
announcements would vary across all 23 events. However, in an effort to be consistent 
and avoid data mining, the same event window characteristics were used throughout the 
time period. In theory, this could result in missing abnormal returns that occur outside of 
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the event window. Nevertheless, for this study, it is assumed that all abnormal return 
occurs within the outlined event window. The CARs and results from the significance 
tests are summarized in Table 2.  The number of observations during the estimation 
windows are also shown as the t-statistics calculated from the below CARs were 
distributed with N-d degrees of freedom.  
TABLE 2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Results 
Event Date 
N Observations during 
Estimation Window CAR 
1 25-May-84 120 0.0522 
2 6-Jun-84 4 0.0562 
3 13-Oct-84 87 -0.0118 
4 14-Nov-85 120 0.0110 
5 12-Dec-85 16 0.0057 
6 21-Aug-86 120 -0.0093 
7 21-Oct-86 39 0.0058 
8 15-May-87 120 -0.0452 
9 10-Aug-87 56 -0.0309* 
10 29-Sep-87 32 -0.0301** 
11 7-Aug-89 120 -0.0038 
12 8-Nov-89 63 -0.0212* 
13 9-Aug-90 120 0.0056 
14 28-Oct-90 53 0.0031 
15 5-Nov-90 2 - 
16 6-Apr-93 120 -0.0131 
17 10-Aug-93 84 -0.0100 
18 29-Mar-96 120 -0.0170 
19 5-Aug-97 120 -0.0099 
20 11-Jun-02 120 0.0184 
21 27-May-03 120 0.0035 
22 16-Nov-04 120 0.0085 
23 20-Mar-06 120 -0.0033 
***Statistically significant at the .01 level, **at the .05 level, and *at the .10 level 
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Overall, the results suggest that historically over the period from 1984 to 2006, 
raising the debt ceiling had an insignificant effect on the stock market returns of 
commercial banks in the United States. None of the periods for which there was a 
standard 120 day estimation window produced significant results. The results for these 
events whose tests were performed with greater degrees of freedom are expected to be 
more accurate than those with fewer. Thus, this provides strong evidence that the Events 
1, 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 16 and 18 through 23 did not significantly impact the stock returns of 
the banks. For these events, we failed to reject the null that CAR is equal to zero.  
Furthermore, we failed to reject the null for Events 2, 3, 5, 7, 14, and 17. All of 
these events occurred fewer than 120 days after a previous event and as a result had a 
shortened estimation window. The shorter estimation period resulted in fewer degrees of 
freedom and a wider t-distribution, therefore, making it necessary for the t-value to be 
larger in order to be determined significant. It is possible that, if the estimation period 
could have been measured for a longer duration, the CARs for these events may have 
been significant. Events 3 and 17 were the only events of this group that produced 
hypothesized negative result. As detailed earlier, it is expect that raising the debt ceiling 
would result in a decrease in the stock returns for banks. Therefore, although these events 
could have produced significant results if they had more degrees of freedom, Events 2, 5, 
7, and 14 possibly could produce a positive CAR. This result would suggest that these 
announcements actually had a positive effect on the banks’ stock prices.   
 The only events that produced significant results were Events 9, 10, and 12. 
Events 9 and 10 occur within 60 and 100 days after Event 8, respectively. Event 9, on 
August 10, 1987, with a CAR of -0.0309 is significant at the .10 level and Event 10, 
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occurring 34 days after Event 9 on September 29, 1987, is significant at the .05 level with 
a CAR of -0.301. Over 3 events during a period of 100 days, the United States’ debt 
ceiling was raised for an average amount of $2.49 trillion, totaling over $7.4 trillion. 
Previously, the largest increase in the debt ceiling level had been $2.3 trillion, a level 
which all three of these events surpassed. The first announcement of the three, Event 8 on 
May 15th, 1987, was not as out of the ordinary, raising the debt level $2.32 trillion, but 
certainly the country having to raise the level over $5 trillion more over the next few 
months certainly could have caused concern in investors. As a result, the CAR in the 
stock returns of the banking industry was significant for the following two events, with 
Event 10 being significant at the .05 level. Furthermore, if the t-distributions for these 
two events were able to have more degrees of freedom, the variance in the distribution 
would have been lessened and the results could have been even more significant. On 
Monday, October 19th 1987, the stock market crashed, with the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average dropping by the largest point drop in history, plummeting 508 points. Causes 
and proceedings culminating with stock market crash in 1987 could have affected the 
significance of Events 9 and 10 in 1987. However, with the crash occurring after these 
announcements, it is unclear if they are at all related. Further research and consideration 
is required to explore their conceivable connection23. 
 The other event that produced a CAR that rejected that null was Event 12, which 
was significant at the .10 level. Like Events 9 and 10, this event, occurring on November 
8, 1989 occurred just 65 days after Event 11. Over the three day event window, a CAR of 
-0.0212, or -2.12%, was accumulated. The announcement in August 1989 marked the 
first time it had been raised since the events in 1987. In August, the debt ceiling increased 
                                                        
23 "Setting the Record Straight on the Dow Drop". New York Times. 1987-10-26. 
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by $2.87 trillion. Shortly thereafter, in November the United States called for another 
record increase of over $3 trillion. This consecutive increase appears to be the cause of a 
significant abnormal return in the stock returns of the banking industry. The three 
significant events in this study all have an abbreviated estimation window, coming 
shortly after a previous heightening of the debt ceiling. It seems that raising the debt 
ceiling a second time (or third in the case of Event 10) in a brief period of time provokes 
an impact in stock prices. 
 A problem that could have weakened the results of the event study was the 
autocorrelation between the abnormal returns over the event window. By not controlling 
for this in the standard deviation, it could have potentially led to the rejection of null 
hypotheses, when in fact the CAR was not statistically significant. However, except for 
possibly with the three events that produced significant results, the ignorance of the 
autocorrelation of abnormal errors, did not skew the conclusion that the results of the test 
produced. If anything, without controlling for autocorrelation, the results were more 
significant than they should have been, but nonetheless, we still failed to reject. In 
addition, it is possible that the abnormal returns could occur later than expected in this 
study, in which case a longer event window would be necessary to capture these 
abnormal returns.  
 
4.3 Regression Results Using Dummy Variables: Results 
 The purpose of these regressions is to supplement the event study and introduce 
another way to test for the significance of a particular event on stock returns. In these 
regressions, the banks’ daily stock returns were regressed against the market return, S&P 
500, as well as a dummy variable. The dummy variable was used to identify the event 
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date, where during the estimation window, the dummy was equal to 0 and during the 
event window equal to 1. Therefore, if there was a change in the trend or relationship 
between the banks stock returns and the market return (if the event affected the banks’ 
stock) then the coefficient on the event dummy would be significant.  
TABLE 3: Dummy Variable Regression Results 
Event Date 
Coefficient on S&P500 
(Market Return) 
Coefficient on 
Event Dummy 
1 25-May-84 1.358683*** 0.0046843 
2 6-Jun-84 2.146622** 0.0068451 
3 13-Oct-84 1.909707*** -0.004016 
4 14-Nov-85 1.023788*** 0.0015032 
5 12-Dec-85 1.35079*** 0.0025653 
6 21-Aug-86 1.031623*** -0.008185 
7 21-Oct-86 0.9977569*** -0.0036367 
8 15-May-87 1.202343*** -0.0128069 
9 10-Aug-87 0.9845564*** -0.0081974* 
10 29-Sep-87 0.8467639*** -0.0049474 
11 7-Aug-89 0.9759472*** -0.0023013 
12 8-Nov-89 0.6857118*** -0.0025796 
13 9-Aug-90 0.6756847*** 0.0047863 
14 28-Oct-90 0.8402263*** -0.0053842 
15 5-Nov-90 - - 
16 6-Apr-93 0.6387377*** -0.0031268 
17 10-Aug-93 1.128805*** 0.0011635 
18 29-Mar-96 0.7982379*** 0.0002152 
19 5-Aug-97 1.035761*** -0.0060374 
20 11-Jun-02 1.000502*** -0.0002804 
21 27-May-03 1.005591*** -0.0015356 
22 16-Nov-04 1.030605*** 0.0009354 
23 20-Mar-06 0.7792825*** -0.0000766 
***Statistically significant at the .01 level, **at the .05 level, and *at the .10 level 
 
 As expected, the results of the regressions show that the events were not 
statistically significant in affecting the banks’ stock returns. The only result that was 
significant was Event 9, at the .10 level, which in the event study proved to also produce 
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a CAR significant at the .10 level. In the regression, the coefficient on the event dummy 
means that if it is a day during the event window, during which the dummy is equal to 1, 
the banks’ stock return for the day will decrease by the amount of the coefficient. In 
Event 9, the results show that a day during the event window would lead to a decline of 
0.008185 or 0.8185% in the banks’ stock returns. For this particular event, the results of 
this regression echo the results from the event study itself and the abnormal return that 
was calculated and tested.  
 However, while Event 9 produced results that were consistent with the results 
from the event study, the coefficients for the event dummies for Events 10 and 12 were 
not statistically significant. Although it is expected that the dummy variables for these 
events would be significant because their CARs were significant, several main reasons 
could contribute to the inconsistency. First, the simple regression using a dummy variable 
is a much more simplistic approach and does not account for the aggregation of abnormal 
returns over the period as the CAR does. Furthermore, having an event window that 
spans over several days, the CAR can still be significant if the stock returns reaction to 
the news is delayed or if it is priced in a day early. However, in this case, a day during the 
event window that does not produce abnormal returns could potentially cause the entire 
coefficient to be insignificant due to the lack of observations and brevity of the event 
window. 
V. Limitations 
In this study, there were several main limitations to the research, the application 
of the methodology, and the eventual arrival at results. Mainly, only one specific scenario 
was used to be tested: with firms’ securities pooled into a single portfolio, several main 
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assumptions about standard errors, and with a single and constant duration for abnormal 
return. With more time and further research, the possible impacts and varied results that 
could potentially result from different techniques could be explored.  
 One of the first limitations of this research is how the security or asset was 
formulated to represent the “banking industry.” In this study, the banks’ stocks were 
pooled together to form a single security so that the effects of raising the debt ceiling 
could be easily tested across multiple firms simultaneous. However, assuming that the 
returns of each firm were uncorrelated could be misleading. In fact, one firms’ stock 
returns could very possibly impact the returns of other related firms, resulting in distorted 
results. Instead of testing them individual, this paper assumes cross-sectional 
independence, that the residuals are uncorrelated across securities. This allows the firms 
returns to be tested collectively. With more time, it would be advisable to treat all the 
firms separately and test the impacts of these events on individual firms, which might 
lead to more significant and meaningful results.  
 Another limitation of this research was the standard error that was used in testing 
the statistics. With assuming mean independence across time as well as autocorrelation of 
abnormal returns, it greatly simplified the standard error used in the testing procedure. In 
future research and the continuation of this study, it would be useful to control for time 
correlation instead of assuming it does not exist. By adjusting and controlling for time 
correlation, the results would not only be more accurate but could potentially contribute 
to a more significant piece of research.  
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VI. Conclusion 
 The accumulation of federal debt has become over the years increasingly more of 
a hot-button issue. Especially, after the United States debt crisis in the summer of 2011, 
leading to the eventual downgrade of the US Treasury by Standard and Poor’s, the rising 
debt levels potentially could have an impact in capital markets. With the banking industry 
taking up increasingly a larger share and importance in the global economy, the possible 
impact that the growing sovereign debt has on the market valuation is of greater interest. 
Thus, as a result, this paper set out to explore the relationship that the United States rising 
debt historically has had on the stock returns of the banking industry. In doing so, the 
events of raising the debt ceiling were used as proxies for the national debt level, and 
using an event study methodology, the effects of these events were measured and tested 
for their significance.  
 In this paper, the main method to investigate the relationship between stock 
returns and debt ceiling announcements was an event study methodology. In estimating 
the normal return of the banks’ stocks during the estimation window leading up to the 
announcement, the relationship between the banks’ stock prices and the S&P 500 proved 
to be strong and significant. Therefore, the market return leading up to the event was a 
good estimate of the return that commercial banks experienced over this period. 
Furthermore, on average the coefficient on the market return was close to 1, therefore 
showing that the return for banks was very consistent with that of the entire market. 
However, the results from testing the significance of the CAR of each event were a lot 
less telling. In fact, despite three events, on August 10th, 1987, September 29th, 1987, and 
November 8th, 1989, all events failed to reject the null of 0 cumulative abnormal return. 
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The events in August 1987 and November 1989 were significant at the .10 level whereas 
the September 1987 event was significant at the .05-level. During each of these events, 
the estimation periods were shorter because these announcements came shortly after a 
previous announcement. In other words, the United States debt ceiling was heightened 
more than once within a period of 120 days, or in the case of 1987, it was raised 3 times 
within that same time frame. The rapidity of consecutive announcements could 
undoubtedly contribute to the significance of the results. On the other hand, the short 
estimation window used for these tests limits the observations and degrees of freedom. 
As a result, it limits the accuracy of the test results, because they abnormal returns are 
assumed to be distributed approximately normally as N, number of observations, 
increases. With limited observations, the results certainly could be askew as a result. 
 Nevertheless, despite three observances producing significant results, the event 
study results as a whole showed a weak and insignificant relationship between the 
announcements and stock market returns. However, it could have been expected that 
raising the debt level would have little impact on the stock returns of the banking 
industry. Until recently, the issue of raising the national debt level had not come under as 
much scrutiny, both economically and politically. In the summer of 2011, the political 
stagnation concerning raising the debt level provided record swings in stock prices and 
eventual led to its downgrade. But, historically the United States treasury had been 
viewed as a “risk-free” investment. It follows that raising the debt allowance could 
potentially have little impact in markets if still considered to be “risk-free.” The results 
from this event study show that investors from 1984 to 2006 have continued to view US 
Treasuries as “risk-free” investments. As a result, raising the debt level would cause little 
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to no reaction in investors, as reflected in insignificant abnormal return for the events in 
this study.  
 In accordance with the results from the event study, the regressions using a 
dummy variable for the events produced insignificant coefficients. The only significant 
result, consistent with the event study, was the event on August 10th 1987. Overall, these 
regressions showed that the events did not significantly affect or impact the linear 
relationship between the market return and the banks’ stock returns.  
 There are recognizable issues omitted in this paper. First, in measuring the 
abnormal returns for the stocks as a result of the event announcements, I was unable to 
control for events outside of the debt ceiling announcements that would affect the stock 
prices. Furthermore, this problem exists throughout the estimation window. Further 
research and adjustments are necessary to isolate the true “normal return” of the stocks 
over the estimation period. Events outside of the scope of interest of this paper affect the 
stock returns and skew the results and measurements of the abnormal returns. This study 
did not exclude potential occurrences and simply assumed the announcements were the 
only events that potentially would result in abnormal return. Further work and research is 
necessary to control for these types of circumstances in order to obtain more accurate 
results. Another problem that exists is the potential correlation between the stock returns 
of the firms included in the “banking industry” portfolio, whose weighted average stock 
returns were used for the event study. In order to do this event study, it was necessary to 
assume that all of the banks’ stock returns were uncorrelated. Furthermore, the potential 
existence of autocorrelation between abnormal returns over the event window was not 
investigated and rather assumed to be a non-issue. In future work, the existence of the 
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autocorrelation could be controlled for using adjusted standard errors. Despite the above 
listed omitted considerations, the results were quite consistent.  
 Sizable research remains to investigate the relationship between the growing 
United States debt and the stock returns of the banking industry. Advanced work could 
seek to control for the issues outlined above and possible extend the study past 2006 to 
the present time, including the 2011 debt crisis. Moreover, the study of the summer of 
2011 would be helpful to study over the entire debt ceiling discussion, measuring the 
effect of individual news events on the market returns. Nonetheless, this paper was 
successful in showing that, from 1984 to 2006, the events when the United States’ debt 
ceiling was raised overall insignificantly impacted the stock returns of the banking 
industry.  
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